


























Are women better police officers? 
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Can the feminization of public services improve quality and lower corruption? 
The underlying logic of such efforts is the belief that women have higher 
ethical standards than men. To answer this question, we examine the links 
between gender and policing practice using data from twelve vignette cases 
assessed by 600 Ugandan police officers. Our empirical strategy is based on a 
randomized framing experiment, which is designed to isolate the effect of 
gender from institutional factors and social norms. We find that the gender of 
the police officer depicted in the cases and victim gender are not related to the 
judgment of police malpractice, nor to suggested disciplinary measures. 
However, respondent gender matters for the reporting of misconduct and the 
perception of the official institutional policy of the police. Men are stricter 
when assessing cases along these dimensions. The results indicate that simply 
feminizing the police force is unlikely to enhance service quality. 
Keywords 
Gender, discrimination, stereotyping, police, survey experiments, Uganda.  
JEL classification 
C90, J16, O12. 
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This paper studies gender, corruption and ethical judgments among police officers in Uganda 
using randomized survey experiments. We contribute novel evidence that sheds doubt on the 
assumption that feminizing public services, in itself, will improve the quality of services and 
lower corruption.  
Strengthening the role of women in the police is often seen as a silver-bullet in the fight 
against corruption and crime (Gutierrez, 2003). The line of reasoning is that women are more 
trustworthy, competent, pro-social and respectful (Gray, 2013; Kahn, 2013; Sichel, 1978).  
Based on such reasoning, a number of initiatives have been implemented to induct women into 
law-enforcement activities. One such program that has received considerable international 
attention is the ‘Black Mambas Anti-Poaching Unit’.1 This group of young South African 
women, hunting poachers in Kruger National Park, has received the UN's 2015 Champions of 
the Earth Award for Inspiration and Action (Wills, 2015). The United Nations Environment 
Programme (2015) claims that since the Black Mamba Anti-Poaching Unit started its work in 
2013, “the number of rhinos lost to poaching has plummeted, snaring and illegal bush-meat 
incidents have been reduced by 75 per cent, and nine poacher incursions have been detected, 
leading to the arrests of the offenders.” For the case of Nigeria, where female police officers 
are also very common, Adebayo (2005) claims that female and older officers are more ‘ethical’. 
There is similar, anecdotal evidence on the feminization of the police in South America. The 
World Bank, in its 1994-2000 Transport Rehabilitation Project, championed Peru’s efforts to 
recruit female police officers to restore the image of the traffic police (Gutierrez, 2003). A 
decade after the launch of this feminization campaign, female police officers believe that they 
have contributed to a reduction in low-level corruption, although, they continue to identify 
corruption as the biggest problem of the Peruvian police (Karim, 2011). In a similar vein, in 
1999, the police chief of Mexico City initiated a major anti-corruption initiative by setting up 
an all-female traffic police force (Moore, 1999).2 While there is no systematic study of this 
initiative, casual evidence suggests that female police officers also ask for bribes (Gray, 2013; 
Kahn, 2013). 
Existing evidence on the feminization of the police is intriguing, but purely anecdotal. 
Rigorous causal evidence on such feminization efforts is scant and it is unclear how much of 
                                                 
1 See the website of the group: http://www.blackmambas.org/ [Accessed October 6, 2015] 
2 Similar efforts have been undertaken in Mexico State, but the female police officers were not allowed to issue 
tickets, as their unit was not officially approved by the state (Kahn, 2013). 
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the ‘success’ simply stems from the publicity and scrutiny that comes with such programs. In 
addition, much of the evidence stems from male-dominated societies and institutions, where 
women even if they enter male domains, tend to fill positions of lower rank and have less room 
to engage in fraudulent behavior (Prenzler and Sinclair, 2013). 3  
This paper contributes to the debate on gender and policing by directly examining the 
underlying logic of feminization campaigns that have been implemented in a number of 
developing countries. The paper generates novel quantitative evidence based on an original 
survey of 600 police officers. The case of Uganda is interesting as its police is regarded as 
particularly corrupt (Transparency International-Kenya, 2011; Flanary and Watt, 1999; Watt 
et al., 1999; Biddle et al., 1998) and thus lends itself to a study of corruption and gender within 
a sensitive work environment.  
Surveying police officers, especially on gender issues is not straightforward. Ideally we 
would want to observe actual behavior of police officers in the field by gender of officer, victim 
and perpetrator. This poses several problems: First, it is not easy to observe and measure illegal 
policing behavior. Second, quantitative analysis requires many, relatively uniform cases. Third, 
the gender of the police officer, victim and perpetrator is likely to be endogenous to the case 
and circumstances. For instance, it is possible that male officers or victims are more likely to 
be involved in violent crime (Rowe et al., 1995) or female police officers are more likely to be 
deployed in cases of domestic violence and sexual assault. Police officers could be directly 
asked about the role of gender in their daily work practice. This, however, raises concerns about 
over-reporting of socially expected behavior or under-reporting of bad practices in relation to 
gender.  
To address these empirical concerns and add plausibly causal evidence to the literature, 
we make use of a survey experiment.  Police officers were confronted with twelve hypothetical 
vignette cases carefully tailored to the local context. The cases ranged from traffic offences to 
robbery and murder.  In these cases we randomly changed the gender of the police officer 
depicted in the case and the gender of the victim/perpetrator.4 This exogenous variation allows 
us to estimate the impact of gender ‘framing’ in these cases. It is important to note that police 
                                                 
3 In Africa, female police officers are not uncommon. As early as in 1995, women constituted 18 percent of the 
total South African police which rose to 20 percent in 1998 (Rauch, 2001). In our representative survey from 
Uganda, 23 percent of the respondents are female. In 2011, in Uganda, 33 percent of the positions in public service 
were held by women (UNDP, 2012). 
 
4 We used common Ugandan male and female surnames such as Mary, Charlotte, Joseph, and James. 
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officers were unaware of the gender angle or framing of the study. An additional novelty of 
this paper is that it is not a laboratory experiment with students, but that our research involves 
actual police officers.  
Overall, we find that cases are judged independently of the gender of the victim/ 
perpetrator and the gender of the police agents depicted in the case. In addition to the randomly 
changed gender, we also assess the impact of the survey respondents’ gender and observe four 
patterns: (i) In a majority of cases, female and male police officers display the same ethical 
standards (ii) Male respondents are significantly more likely to indicate that they would report 
misbehavior and corruption (iii) When it comes to choosing the most appropriate disciplinary 
measures, we do not observe gender differences (iv) Male police officers are more likely to 
indicate that the misbehaviors presented in the cases would be considered a violation of official 
policing rules in their agency. One case stands out: petty theft, which is considered significantly 
more severe and more likely to be reported if the offending police officer, who illegitimately 
puts money into their own pocket, is a woman. This is a particularly interesting finding as it is 
the only case with that pattern. It suggests double standards within the police with female 
officers having to live up to higher expectations when it comes to situations in which they could 
gain small personal advantages. 
Our findings point to power structures within the police, where men in leading positions 
are aware of the official rules and know whom to turn to for reports of inappropriate behavior. 
To put our findings in context it is important to know that at the level of the Ugandan central 
police station, 79 percent of the administrative positions are held by men (Mutagubya, 2013). 
Because of their leading positions, male police officers are perhaps more aware of 
inappropriate behavior according to the official code of conduct. Women hold lower positions, 
are less aware and more restricted in their responses when observing misbehavior among their 
colleagues. Overall, our results suggest that the effect of feminization campaigns on service 
quality is likely to be limited.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss existing evidence 
on gender differences in ethical judgments and perceptions. We provide details on the Ugandan 
background in Section 3. Section 4 describes the survey instruments and data. Section 5 
outlines the framing of the survey experiment and the empirical strategy. The results are 






2. Existing Evidence on Gender Differences 
While the body of work on gender and the quality of police services and corruption in the police 
is limited, there are a number of non-experimental and experimental studies which have shown 
that women are the ‘better’ sex -  women have been found to be less corrupt (Dollar et al., 2001; 
Swamy et al., 2001), more altruistic (Simmons and Emanuele, 2007; Eckel and Grossman, 
1998), more trustworthy (Buchan et al., 2008), more peaceful (Gizelis, 2009; Caprioli, 2000) 
more equalitarian (Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001), more likely to reciprocate (Croson and 
Buchan, 1999) and more likely to favor welfare spending (Gidengil, 1995; Welch and Hibbing, 
1992). 
However, the entire body of work does not unequivocally support the claim that women 
are inherently more pro-social and ethical.  Women have been found to be neither more nor 
less socially oriented, but simply more sensitive in accounting for social conditions compared 
to men (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). When confronted with ethical dilemmas in the form of 
vignettes, women do not appear to have stronger ethical beliefs (Loo, 2003). With regard to 
gender and corruption, laboratory evidence suggests that women are not intrinsically more 
honest, but more opportunistic when they have a chance to break an implicitly corrupt contract. 
This results in lower corruption in mixed gender teams (Frank et al., 2011). Alatas et al. (2009) 
conducted corruption experiments with students from four countries (Australia, India, 
Indonesia, and Singapore). The authors document gender-differences in Australia, but not for 
the three Asian countries. They conclude that gender differences in attitudes towards corruption 
are not universal and thus, not only biological but also culturally formed. As opposed to lab 
experiments, Armantier and Boly (2008) compared gender differences in corruption amongst 
teachers in Burkina Faso. Experimental subjects had to grade 20 exams of which one exam 
paper came with a bribe. They found that females and males were equally likely to accept a 
bribe, but women were more responsive to monitoring and punishment.  
The accumulated evidence on women’s willingness to engage in corrupt behaviour 
suggests that contextual factors matter rather than gender per se (Esarey, and Chirillo, 2013; 
Alatas et al., 2009; Alhassan-Alolo, 2007; Schulze and Frank, 2003; Sung, 2003). For instance, 
Goetz (2007) argues that most of the findings associated with reduction in corruption and the 
representation of women are confined to liberal democracies, which are less corrupt in the first 
place. Additionally, it is a matter of opportunities to engage in corrupt practices and due to the 
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gendered nature of access to politics and public office women have fewer opportunities to 
engage in corruption (Goetz, 2007).  
 
 
3. Background: The Uganda National Police  
The Ugandan police force was institutionalized in 1906 (Uganda Police Force, 2007) and in 
April 2010 was officially named ‘Uganda National Police’ (Lumu, 2014). It is divided into 20 
directorates based on tasks, and in regional and district offices, police stations and posts 
(Uganda Police, 2015). The head of the Uganda National Police is the Inspector General of 
Police.  
Reliable data on the police and policing activities is scant since the statistical capacity 
of the administration is not very strong (Uganda Police Force, 2007). In the early 2000s, 
Uganda had less than 15,000 police officers with considerable year-to-year variation 
(Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2006a). In 2007, the Ugandan police experienced a 
major increase and the creation of more directorates in preparation for the Commonwealth 
Heads of Government Meeting; the police force expanded from approximately 27,000 to 
48,000 officers (Xinhua News Agency, 2007). According to data gathered from district level 
administrative sources, which may not always be accurate, the Ugandan police employed more 
than 48,000 officers in 2013. This amounts to roughly 128 officers per 100,000 inhabitants and 
is substantially lower than the average in the European Union.5  At the end of 2014, the 
Inspector General announced plans to increase the police force to 65,000 officers (Kakamwa, 
2014). Detailed information concerning the types of services provided by police officers is not 
available.  
In 2013, 99,959 crimes were reported in Uganda, resulting in a crime rate of 273 per 
100,000. In 2009, 103,000 crimes were recorded (Uganda Police, 2013). Public sector crime 
investigations have been on the rise. The Ugandan police reported 413 investigations in 2013, 
compared to 214 in 2012. The annual report by the police does not provide any background 
information on the type of crime. Thus, it is unclear if police officers are systematically 
included in these figures. However, official statistics from 2012 indicate that, in at least 19 
                                                 
5 The average EU country had about 350 officers per 100,000 inhabitants in 2012. The EU member with the lowest 
number of officers is Finland with 151 officers per 100,000 population. For more details see EuroStat (2014), 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php/Crime_statistics#Further_Eurostat_information 




cases, police officers were involved in the crimes that were investigated. The majority of 
citizens consider the police the most corrupt institution in Uganda. This has been consistently 




4. Survey Instruments and Data  
This paper uses data from a survey of 600 police officers in 10 districts of Uganda.6 The survey 
took place in April 2015 and was carried out as part of an impact evaluation of a police-civil 
society project known as Police Accountability and Reform Project (PARP) that was 
implemented to foster exchanges between civil society and the police.7 The project was carried 
out by the Human Rights Network Uganda (HURINET-U).  
The Ugandan police force is organized into 16 police regions, which are further sub-
divided into police districts. Districts include police stations and posts. We picked ten districts 
at random, but never more than one district per region to ensure regional coverage. Within each 
of the selected districts, 60 police officers were selected and requested to participate in a self-
administered pen and paper questionnaire in a classroom setting. Individual police officers 
were picked in a stratified way in collaboration with HURINET-U. To capture officers across 
all ranks, also officers in leading positions from the overarching regional level were identified 
based on their position to participate in the survey. Similarly, at the district level, the leading 
police officers of the headquarters were purposively included in the survey. Police stations 
within districts were then randomly sampled with half the officers in our sample coming from 
stations that have no more than 10 officers and 70% of the officers are from stations with up to 
25 officers. The day of the survey was randomly picked and police officers from the local 
stations participated in the survey based on availability or presence. Since the local police 
stations consist of a small number of officers, we do not expect any systematic selection of 
participants into our sample. The aim of our sampling procedure was to have a stratified sample 
of officers that represents the full spectrum of police work, functions, positions and hierarchies. 
During the survey, each officer was provided enough personal space so as to ensure privacy 
and confidentiality. To ensure anonymity, officers were not asked to provide their names or 
addresses and hence it is not possible to identify the individual respondent.  
                                                 
6 The districts are Bushenyi, Iganga, Jinja Kabale, Kabarole, Tororo, Luwero, Mbarara, Mityana and Soroti. 
7 Detailed information about PARP is available in Hout et al. (2015). 
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The survey had two parts. In the first part, officers provided information on socio-
economic characteristics. In the second and core part, officers were asked to review a series of 
twelve vignette cases that were adapted from Klockars et al. (2000). In collaboration with 
HURINET-U and the Uganda Police Force, the cases were changed to suit the local context, 
while irrelevant cases were deleted and new context-specific cases were developed.  
The vignettes reflect real dilemmas and situations faced by the Ugandan police. In the 
survey, the cases were presented in no particular sequence to rule out ordering effects. For the 
analysis, we grouped the cases into five categories:8 The first group of cases looks at the code 
of conduct among police officers themselves. The second and largest group of cases covers 
undue advantage, bribery and fraud. In particular, the least severe case depicts a situation where 
officers accept free meals and gifts. The next case (4) clearly mentions the word bribe and sets 
its value at half the amount of the official fine. Case 5 describes personal enrichment of about 
a daily wage. The sixth case describes theft, during a burglary investigation, of about a month’s 
pay (see Appendix for details).  The third group of cases contains situations, in which officers 
refuse to register a complaint against their colleagues. In the fourth group, we include two cases 
of severe crimes against individuals, which are not followed up by the police. Finally, the fifth 
group contains situations of undue force used by the police against suspects and demonstrators. 
For the purpose of this study, we further ordered the cases by severity within each of the five 
categories. This yields the following grouping of the twelve cases: 
 
Group 1: Code of conduct among police officers 
Case 1:  Police mechanic repairing supervisor’s car in exchange for holidays 
Case 2: Police officer driving drunk and having an accident goes unreported by colleague 
 
Group 2: Situations of undue advantage, bribery and fraud 
Case 3: Acceptance of freely offered meals and small gifts while on duty 
Case 4: Speeding not reported in exchange for a bribe 
Case 5: Officer taking money from a found wallet 
Case 6: Police officer stealing goods while investigating a burglary 
 
Group 3: Refusal to register complaints 
Case 7: Refusal to register a complaint and humiliation of the complainant 
Case 8: Refusal to register a complaint and a one-week detention for the complainant for false accusation 
 
                                                 
8 The original ordering of the cases was as follows: Case 3, Case 4, Case 6, Case 9, Case 1, Case 2, Case 7, Case 
11, Case 5, Case 10, Case 12, Case 8. 
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Group 4: Reported severe crimes against individuals not followed up upon 
Case 9: Police officer refusing to register wife beating 
Case 10: Reported murder not being followed up on 
 
Group 5: Undue force used by the police 
Case 11: Foot patrol torturing a thief 
Case 12: Brutal strike down of a demonstration 
 
The exact wording of the cases and the questionnaires as administered may be found in the 
appendix and attachment to the article. In turn, after each case, the police officers answered the 
following questions that are used in the analysis: 
 
1. How serious do YOU consider this behavior to be? 
2. Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior? 
3. How serious do MOST POLICE OFFICERS IN YOUR OFFICE consider this behavior to be? 
4. If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if any discipline do 
YOU think SHOULD follow? 
5. Would this behavior be regarded as a violation of official policy in your agency?   
 
The possible answer categories range on a Likert scale from 1 to 5. Questions 1 and 3 could be 
answered on a categorical scale from 1 [not at all serious] to 5 [very serious]. Responses to 
Questions 2 and 5 ranged from ‘definitely not’ [1] to ‘definitely yes’ [5].  Question 4 on 
disciplinary measures that should follow the discovery of such wrongdoings included the 
categories ‘none’ [1], ‘verbal reprimand’ [2], ‘written reprimand’ [3], ‘period of suspension 
without pay’ [4], ‘demotion in rank’ [5] and ‘dismissal’ [6].  
Using these twelve hypothetical cases we attempt to obtain an idea of the culture of 
policing in Uganda. The advantage of using vignettes is that the cases are identical across 
officers and since we do not ask about the officers’ actual behavior but rather their assessment 
of theoretical cases in a private and anonymized setting such an approach should be less likely 
to yield socially desirable responses.  
Descriptive statistics of the respondent’s socio-demographic characteristics, as well as 
all cases and related responses are presented in Tables 1 and 2. Our sample of 600 police 
officers is representative of the gender-mix of the Ugandan Police Force as 77 percent of the 
respondents are male. The average age is almost 42 years, indicating that we interviewed 
experienced police officers. Concerning the household situation of the police officers, 84 
percent are married and live in households with an average of between six and seven people. 
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Only 25 percent of officers have more than secondary education.  The large majority of the 
officers, about 95 percent, indicate that they responded honestly to the questions.  
The average assessments are presented in Table 2.  The mean value as well as the share 
of respondents picking the lowest (categories 1 and 2) and highest scores (categories 4 and 5) 
are presented. None of the offences are seen as trivial. However, we do observe the expected 
patterns in terms of judging the severity of the cases. The first group of cases pertaining to the 
code of conduct among the police tends to be judged mildly. One fourth of the respondents are 
not very critical (answer categories 1 and 2) when a police mechanic repairs a supervisor’s car 
in exchange for holidays or when an inebriated police officer has an accident and is not reported 
by a colleague. Similarly, the receipt of free meals and small gifts is perceived as a minor 
offence as indicated by the average score of 3.53. Acceptance of a bribe is considered a serious 
offence by 85 percent of the officers and the average is 4.37. Taking a small bribe is judged 
more severely as compared to stealing the equivalent of a day’s pay (score of 4.37 versus 4.04) 
from a lost wallet. Stealing goods, worth about a month’s pay, after a burglary, receives the 
most critical assessment with 87 percent of the respondents judging this as a very serious 
offence.  
Interestingly, even if officers do not judge an offence too harshly they appear to be 
more inclined to report police officers who engage in an offence. For instance, despite a 
relatively mild average judgment of 3.72 for a case where a police officer repairs a supervisor’s 
car in exchange for holidays, the average score for reporting such an offence is 4.06. In all 
except two cases a police officer’s own assessment of the severity of offences is higher than 
the reaction expected by fellow police officers. This suggests overconfidence in the adequacy 
of one’s own behavior. The overestimation of own ability relative to others is a feature well 
documented in the literature (Dunning et al., 2004; Camerer and Lovallo, 1999; Svenson, 1981). 
Individuals often think that they are ‘better’ or above average. Officers are aware that official 
police policy is likely to be more stringent than their own beliefs. In almost all cases the officers 
judge that their agency would take a more stringent view of violations as compared to their 
own views. For instance, the difference between own judgment and perceived agency policy is 
more than 0.6 for a police officer who refuses to register a complaint by a former arrestee and 







5. The Framing of the Survey Experiment and the Empirical Strategy 
Our aim is to examine the role of gender in Ugandan policing practice using the hypothetical 
cases discussed in the previous section. Policing in general, but even more so in combination 
with gender, is a sensitive issue and asking explicit questions is unlikely to yield credible 
responses.  To elicit responses which permit a credible analysis of gender differences, we 
designed a survey or framing experiment where we randomly administered four versions of the 
questionnaires to the police officers. The four versions attached at the end of this article are 
identical except that in the vignette cases we varied the gender of the depicted police officers, 
who we will refer to as rogue officers in the rest of the paper, and we also varied the gender of 
the victim/perpetrator. Note that all officers faced male and female-framed cases. In other 
words, there is within question variation in framing. The randomized gender framing allows us 
to examine whether the assessment of the severity of the cases and potential ensuing actions 
depends on the gender of the rogue officer and the victim. Most importantly, the police officers 
themselves were not aware of the randomized gender framing. In other words, we can identify 
the causal effect (if any) of gender framing on the survey responses.  
Descriptive statistics by type of questionnaire (Table 1) indicate that randomization is 
well balanced across pre-determined observable characteristics of the respondents. Equality of 
means cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level for all possible comparisons across groups 
except one pair-wise comparison. In Table 2 we present the p-value of the difference-in-means 
test associated with the largest inter-group difference. Group D has the largest share of men 
and group C the smallest. Group differences are small and insignificant for age, marital status, 
household size and education. Average self-reported honesty in responding to the questions 
varies between 93 and 97 percent but is statistically insignificant.  
To examine whether assessments of the severity of the cases and potential actions 
depend on the gender of the rogue officer, the gender of the victim and the gender of the 
respondent, we employ an ordered logit model. The model accounts for the ordinal nature of 
the data, which consists of j categories. The outcome variable is denoted by Yid for every 
individual police officer i in district d. The model then looks as follows: 
 
P(Yid > j) = g(Xid ) = 
exp(𝛼𝑗 – 𝑋𝑖𝑑 𝛽)
1 +exp(𝛼𝑗 – 𝑋𝑖𝑑 𝛽)
                                         (1) 
 
where, Xid  = 1 rogue_officerid + 2 victimid + 3 genderid + Indid’ 4  + d. The outcome Yid 
corresponds to any of the responses given to the questions following every vignette. Equation 
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(1) describes the probability that the response of the ith individual is in the jth or higher 
category. The cut-off point for each of the five response variables is denoted by j.9 The gender 
of the rogue officer which randomly varies across vignettes is represented by rogue_officerid 
and the gender of the victim, which also randomly varies, is given by victimid. We also include 
the gender of the respondent, which is denoted by genderid. We coded our gender variables 
such that 1 identifies males and 0 females. In addition, the individual level control variables 
are included in the matrix Indid. The specification controls for age, a dummy indicating whether 
educational attainment is secondary school or lower, a dummy for being married, and 
household size. In addition the specification controls for district-level characteristics such as 
differences in local policing cultures by including district dummies d. Standard errors are 
clustered at the district level. 
For each case, we present odds ratios associated with the gender of the rogue officer, if 
available the gender of the victim, and the gender of the respondent.10 An odds ratio greater 
than one indicates that men are more likely to engage in certain types of behavior. Gauging 
magnitudes of odds ratios is not straightforward. Note that odds ratios may be translated into 
Cohen’s d to judge effect size (see Borenstein et al. 2009). An odds ratio of 1.44 corresponds 
to a ‘small’ but meaningful effect (i.e. d=0.2 of Cohen’s standardized effect size for continuous 
variables in multivariate regressions). Our sample size is large enough to detect odds ratios 
slightly larger than a ‘small’ effect of 1.5. We used the power calculations proposed by 
Whitehead (1993) for proportional odds ordinal logistic model.11  In addition, the inclusion of 




The results are reported in Tables 3 and 4. We first discuss the role of gender in influencing 
the judgment and reporting behavior of the respondent and thereafter the perception of the 
surveyed police officers about the responses of their colleagues and the appropriate disciplinary 
action.  
                                                 
9 For a detailed description of the ordered logit model and its application, see Williams (2006). 
10 In the main tables 1 and 2, we present odds ratios and denote statistical significance at the usual levels with 
stars. We can provide point estimates along with standard errors on request.  As introduced in section 3, we include 
additional co-variates in the analysis. For the sake of brevity, we do not present these coefficients. These are 
available upon request. 
 
11As usual, we set power to 0.8 and type I error 0.05. When we assume equal proportions across the five answer 




Judgment and Reporting 
To start with we consider the role of the gender of the rogue officer in influencing a 
respondent’s judgment about the severity of different practices. As shown in Table 3, column 
1, except for one case, there is no effect of the gender of the rogue officer on the judgment of 
the respondents (Table 3, Column 1).  Similarly, except for two cases, the gender of the rogue 
officer does not influence the reporting of bad practices (Table 3, Column 4). For the two cases 
that display gender differences we find opposite results. If the rogue officer depicted in the case 
that deals with refusing to register a complaint by a former arrestee (Table 3, Column 4, Case 
7) is a man, the likelihood that his misconduct gets reported is significantly higher. The odds 
ratio is 1.76. Yet in case 5, a rogue female officer taking money from a wallet is more likely to 
be reported as compared to her male counterparts as can be seen from the odds ratio of 0.61.  
For several cases (cases 2, 7, 8, 10, 11) we provide estimates of the effect of the victim’s 
gender in influencing the judgment of police officers. These estimates indicate that judgment 
of the severity of the cases is independent of the gender of the victim. Except for one case, the 
same is true with regard to the likelihood of reporting. Across cases, odds ratios are close to 
one and there are no systematic patterns. 
Finally, we examine the effect of the respondent’s gender on their judgment of the 
severity of the various cases (Table 3, Column 3) and on reporting behavior (Table 3, Column 
6). Male and female police officers tend to evaluate the severity of the different situations in 
the same way. That is, in most cases odds ratios are not statistically different from one. Only 
in two cases do male respondents think that the offence is more serious as compared to the 
perception of their female colleagues (Table 3, Column 3, Cases 1 and 6). These are cases 
which deal with a police mechanic repairing a supervisor’s car in exchange for holidays and a 
fellow police officer stealing goods while investigating a burglary. Respondent gender has a 
clear influence when it comes to reporting of bad policing practices (Table 3, column 6). In six 
out of 12 cases, male respondents are more likely to report fellow police officers who engage 
in bad practices. In these six cases gender differences are statistically significant at the 1 or 5 
percent level. In one other case the p-value is 12 percent. The gender differences tend to be 
pronounced for severe misconduct such as acceptance of bribes, stealing while investigating, 
torturing a thief, refusal to register a complaint by a former arrestee and the brutal strike down 
of a demonstration.  
To summarize, there are no gender differences in terms of judging the severity of 
various cases, which suggests that both male and female police officers have similar ethical 
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standards. However, these similar standards do not translate into similar reporting behavior as 
male police officers indicate that would be more likely to report their colleagues as compared 
to female police officers. One interpretation of this pattern, and an issue to which we will return 
later, is that women may feel less secure in their jobs and/or they may occupy relatively lower 
positions in the police hierarchy and hence maybe ‘afraid to speak up’ and report their mainly 
male, senior colleagues. To be more specific, there are 137 women in our sample of 600 
respondents indicating that in absolute numbers women are underrepresented in the police 
force. Only 3 women hold a high-ranking post compared to 31 men, i.e. more than 90% of the 
high rank positions are held by males. Conversely, the percentages of women “within” medium 
and low-ranked position (21% and 27%) are roughly in line with the proportion of female 
respondents (23%).  
 
Judgment of Other Police Officers, Disciplinary Punishment and Official Policy 
To examine differences in respondents’ views between their own judgment of cases and their 
perception about the judgment and the integrity of their colleagues, we also asked “how serious 
do most police officers in your office consider this behavior to be?” As discussed earlier (see 
Table 2), there is evidence that respondents tend to think that they have higher ethical standards 
than their colleagues. Estimates of gender differences in such responses are presented in Table 
4, Columns 1 to 3. With regard to the gender of the rogue officer the estimates indicate that in 
three cases respondents think that the judgment of their colleagues will be affected by the 
gender of the rogue officer. This may be contrasted with their own judgment which is gender 
sensitive in the case of only one vignette. Based on the estimates we may infer that respondents 
think that their colleagues will be less likely to consider non-reporting of speeding (and taking 
a bribe) or taking money from a wallet as a bad practice (Cases 4 and 5) if the rogue officer is 
male. In contrast, respondents indicate that if a male (rogue) officer refuses to register wife 
beating their colleagues are more likely to consider it a serious offence as compared to a 
situation where a female rogue officer refuses to register a complaint (Table 4, Column 9). 
Respondents indicate that the gender of the victims depicted in the cases is unlikely to affect 
the judgment of their colleagues (Table 4, Column 2).  Furthermore, the gender of the 
respondents has no bearing on their judgment of the ethical standards of their colleagues (Table 
4, Column 3). 
Estimates of the effect of gender on the disciplinary measures that respondents think 
should be taken if a police officer engages in malpractice are provided in Table 4, Columns 4 
to 6. By and large, the severity of the disciplinary measure does not depend on the gender of 
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either the rogue officer or the victim (Table 4, Columns 4 and 5). There are two exceptions: 
according to respondents, male officers torturing a thief should be more severely punished 
compared to female officers (Table 4, Columns 4, Case 8) and if an officer, independent of the 
gender, refuses to register the complaint of a woman, he or she should be more severely 
punished according to the respondents (Table 4, Columns 5, Case 8). Estimates of the impact 
of the gender of the respondent on the level of the disciplinary measure are reported in Table 
4, Column 6. As shown earlier, in Table 3, male respondents are more likely to report 
malpractice. Despite this higher reporting propensity, except for two cases, there are limited 
gender differences in opinions about disciplinary measures. Two cases stand out, female 
respondents indicate that officers should get more severely disciplined if they try to cover up 
for a colleague who has had a car accident while inebriated (Table 4, Column 6, Case 2). Male 
respondents suggest more severe punishment for officers who steal money from a wallet that 
they have found (Table 4, Column 6, Case 5). On average, however, we find an odds ratio close 
to 1 for the disciplinary measure and thus no systematic gender differences.  
 Finally, we asked whether the behavior described in the cases would be regarded as 
violations of official police policy (Table 4, Columns 7 to 9). Once again, although there are 
some variations, the effect associated with the randomly changed gender of the rogue officer 
and the victim is small. There are three deviations. First, covering for an inebriated colleague 
involved in a car accident is more likely to be seen as a violation of official policy if the officer 
is male (Table 4, Colum 7, Case 2). Second, if the drunken colleague, i.e. the victim, is a man, 
respondents are more likely to consider this practice a violation of official rules (Table 4, 
Colum 8, Case 2). Third, torturing a thief is more likely to be considered a violation of the rules 
if the officer is a woman (Table 4, Colum 7, Case 11). More interesting is the effect of 
respondent gender on the evaluation of official policy. Male police officers are more likely to 
evaluate the misconduct depicted in the cases as violation of the official rules of policing (Table 
4, Colum 9). Except for one case, the odds ratio is larger than 1 and in five cases the coefficients 
are statistically significant at conventional levels and in another two cases are imprecisely 




Case-specific finding: Case 5 
Across all but one case, we find that neither victims, nor perpetrators nor misbehaving police 
agents are judged differently depending on their gender. This suggests similar ethical standards 
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across both sexes. However, across the various cases, Case 5, Officer taking money from a 
found wallet, stands out. The gender of the rogue officer influences the judgment of the 
respondent, the reporting behavior and the perceived judgment of others. Petty theft, as 
depicted in this case, is considered significantly more severe if the offending police officer is 
a woman (Table 3, Column 1). Rogue male officers are less likely to be judged harshly for 
stealing money. This is interesting, because we also find that male respondents are more likely 
to report this behavior (Table 3, Column 6), but less likely to do so if the rogue officer is male 
(Table 3, Column 4). In addition, the survey experiment reveals that all police officers perceive 
that women will be more critically judged among their fellow office colleagues if they 
misappropriate money (Table 4, Column 1). Moreover, it is the male respondents who opt for 
a more severe punishment of officers who take money from a wallet (Table 4, Column 6). 
These patterns raise the possibility of double standards within the police. Female officers who 
engage in petty theft are more likely to be judged severely and are also more like to be reported.  
 
 
7. Discussion and Conclusion  
This research contributes new evidence to the debate on the feminization of public services. 
More generally, we add evidence to the literature on gender perceptions and stereotyping. 
Earlier studies about gender bias tended to treat gender as a residual category or black box, 
without disentangling the underlying institutional and cultural factors that shape gendered 
realities (Dollar et al., 2001; Swamy et al., 2001). Since then many gender myths have been 
repudiated. Even the widely held belief that women are more emotional has been challenged 
(Feldman Barrett et al., 1998). 
We examined gender perceptions in the context of the Ugandan police force. We 
surveyed 600 Ugandan police officers exposing them to hypothetical cases of policing behavior 
within a framing experiment that randomly varied the gender of the individuals depicted in the 
cases. Across all but one case, we found that gender framing does not influence responses. The 
one exception is petty theft as depicted in Case 5, which is considered significantly more severe 
and more likely to be reported if the rogue police officer is a woman. This suggests that, at 
times, petty theft may be judged more harshly if it is committed by female police officers. 
Overall, we conclude that women have similar ethical standards as men, but their willingness 
to report misbehavior is lower.  
The differences in reporting behavior may in part be attributed to differences in the 
relative positions of men and women in the Ugandan police hierarchy. According to a report 
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put together by the Centre for Women in Governance (2010) only two of the top 14 positions 
in the Ugandan police force were held by women. In our sample, only 8.8% of high-ranked 
posts are held by women. Given the Ugandan context it is perhaps not surprising female police 
officers, who are in the minority, are less likely to report misbehavior as it essentially means 
filing complaints about their senior male colleagues. Female police officers might also be less 
familiar with the official rules and regulations of the agency. Overall, our research supports the 
idea that it is naïve to think that women are inherently more ethical or better police officers.  
How much do the case assessments by police officers tell us about actual policing 
practices? While this question has not been answered in the context of police work, the medical 
literature makes considerable use of vignette techniques and has documented the consistency 
between hypothetical cases and actual behavior for both doctors’ diagnostic skills and patients’ 
tendency to consult a doctor (Peabody et al., 2000; Van der Meer and Mackenbach, 1998). 
Vignette cases and virtual patients are seen as a way of training and assessing medical skills, 
which ultimately have a bearing on the life and death of patients (Triola et al., 2006).  
Future work on gender and police could perhaps employ both vignettes and direct 
observation to assess consistency between the two approaches or a combination of paper 
vignettes with a more behavioral approach in the form of hypothetical plays involving actors 
who engage in the kinds of behavior depicted in the vignettes as is extensively used in medical 
research (Das et al., 2008; Gibbons et al., 2002; Barrows, 1993). Finally it is worth pointing 
out that the methods in this paper lend themselves to study behavioral responses to other 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics and randomization balance 
     Mean by Questionnaire Version  









DiM     
p-value 
Male respondent 0.77  0 1 0.76 0.77 0.71 0.84 0.006 
Age 41.77 9.44 21 60 41.35 41.45 41.72 42.54 0.741 
Married 0.84  0 1 0.88 0.85 0.80 0.84 0.061 
Household size 6.67 3.99 1 25 6.68 6.89 6.56 6.56 0.476 
Secondary education or less 0.75  0 1 0.74 0.72 0.79 0.76 0.168 
Honest reporting 0.95  0 1 0.93 0.97 0.94 0.94 0.107 
Notes: 600 respondents across 10 districts. The age of two respondents is missing. DiM denotes,  
difference in means. It is the difference between the largest and the smallest average value across the 
four groups. The associated p-value is reported. 
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Table 2: Case summary statistics – Means and proportions of responses 
  
How serious do YOU 
consider this behavior to 
be?[not at all serious 1-5 
very serious] 
Do you think YOU 
would report a fellow 
police officer who 
engaged in this 
behavior?[definitely not 
1-5 definitely yes] 
How serious do MOST 
POLICE OFFICERS 
IN YOUR OFFICE 
consider this behavior to 
be? [not at all serious 1-
5 very serious] 
If an officer in your 
agency engaged in this 
behavior and was 
discovered doing so, 
what if any discipline 




Would this behavior be 
regarded as a violation 
of official policy in 
your agency?  



























Group 1: Code of conduct among the police officers                 
    1. Police mechanic repairing supervisor’s car in exchange for holidays 3.72 0.25 0.67 4.06 0.26 0.54 3.69 0.22 0.63 3.80 0.17 0.54 4.24 0.14 0.81 
    2. Police officer driving drunk and having an accident goes unreported   
        by colleague 
3.71 0.26 0.65 3.92 0.32 0.50 3.60 0.26 0.58 3.65 0.23 0.52 4.11 0.17 0.77 
Group 2: Situations of undue advantage, bribery and fraud                
    3. Acceptance of freely offered meals and small gifts while on duty 3.53 0.28 0.59 3.17 0.38 0.45 3.45 0.30 0.55 3.15 0.37 0.33 3.96 0.20 0.72 
    4. Speeding not reported in exchange for a bribe 4.37 0.13 0.85 4.25 0.26 0.54 3.92 0.20 0.70 4.31 0.06 0.70 4.54 0.09 0.89 
    5. Officer taking money from a found wallet 4.04 0.20 0.75 4.27 0.25 0.56 3.80 0.21 0.65 4.11 0.13 0.64 4.43 0.10 0.86 
    6. Police officer stealing goods while investigating a burglary 4.47 0.11 0.87 4.60 0.15 0.69 4.33 0.10 0.83 5.07 0.04 0.88 4.64 0.06 0.92 
Group 3: Refusal to register complaints                
    7. Police officer refusing to register a complaint by a former arrestee 3.62 0.28 0.65 4.05 0.26 0.57 3.54 0.26 0.57 3.48 0.23 0.42 4.31 0.12 0.83 
    8. Refusal to register complaint instead keeping victim in detention 4.01 0.27 0.69 4.47 0.10 0.83 3.97 0.22 0.71 4.12 0.11 0.62 4.56 0.09 0.89 
Group 4: Reported severe crimes against individuals not followed up 
upon 
               
    9. Police officer refusing to register wife beating 4.28 0.16 0.83 4.47 0.15 0.70 4.13 0.14 0.79 4.01 0.11 0.58 4.59 0.06 0.90 
  10. Reported murder not being followed up  3.92 0.24 0.73 4.47 0.07 0.86 4.10 0.15 0.77 2.73 0.67 0.25 4.53 0.08 0.89 
Group 5: Undue force used by the police                
  11. Foot patrol torturing a thief  3.9 0.22 0.71 4.08 0.25 0.54 3.78 0.21 0.66 3.88 0.18 0.57 4.35 0.12 0.84 
  12. Brutal strike down of a demonstration 4.12 0.20 0.78 4.05 0.20 0.75 4.24 0.14 0.81 3.92 0.32 0.63 4.51 0.10 0.88 




Table 3: Gender effects on police officer judgment and reporting 
  
How serious do YOU consider this 
behavior to be?[not at all serious 
1-5 very serious] 
Do you think YOU would report a 
fellow police officer who engaged in 
this behavior?[definitely no 1-5 
definitely yes] 
 Gender (Male=1; Female=0) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 







Group 1: Code of conduct among the police officers             
    1. Police mechanic repairing supervisor’s car in exchange for holidays 0.95  1.50** 0.86  1.39° 
    2. Police officer driving drunk and having an accident goes unreported by colleague 0.74 0.88 1.03 0.92 0.95 1.13 
Group 2: Situations of undue advantage, bribery and fraud        
    3. Acceptance of freely offered meals and small gifts while on duty 1.22  0.92 0.87  0.85 
    4. Speeding not reported in exchange for a bribe 1.14  1.41 1.02  1.48** 
    5. Officer taking money from a found wallet 0.60**  1.16 0.61**  2.25*** 
    6. Police officer stealing goods while investigating a burglary 0.72   1.73** 0.88   1.67** 
Group 3: Refusal to register complaints        
    7. Police officer refusing to register a complaint by a former arrestee 0.98 0.9 1.26 1.76*** 0.57*** 1.57** 
    8. Refusal to register complaint instead keeping victim in detention   0.92 1.31   0.77 1.36 
Group 4: Reported severe crimes against individuals not followed up upon        
    9. Police officer refusing to register wife beating 0.92  1.12 1.24  1.13 
  10. Reported murder not being followed up    0.83 1.03   0.84 1.37 
Group 5: Undue force used by the police        
  11. Foot patrol torturing a thief  1.2 1.24 0.87 1.26 1.03 1.78*** 
  12. Brutal strike down of a demonstration     1.01     1.75** 
Simple average of odds ratios in the column 0.94 0.95 1.2 1.05 0.83 1.49 
Note: Covariates include age, marital status, level of education, household size and district dummies. Sample size is 598. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. *,**, 
and *** denote statistical significance associated with the odds ratios at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. ° denotes statistical significance at the 12% level. In case 8 




Table 4: Gender effects on police officer view about colleagues, disciplinary measures and official institutional policy 
  
How serious do MOST 
POLICE OFFICERS IN 
YOUR OFFICE consider this 
behavior to be? [not at all 
serious 1-5 very serious] 
If an officer in your agency 
engaged in this behavior and was 
discovered doing so, what if any 
discipline do YOU think 
SHOULD follow?[none 1-6 
dismissal] 
Would this behavior be 
regarded as a violation of 
official policy in your 
agency?  [definitely not 1-5 
definitely yes] 
 Gender (Male=1; Female=0) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 










Group 1: Code of conduct among the police officers              
    1. Police mechanic repairing supervisor’s car in exchange for holidays 0.9  1.29 0.82  1.16 1.03  1.74*** 
    2. Police officer driving drunk and having an accident goes unreported by colleague 0.95 0.76 0.84 0.9 1.08 0.66** 1.63** 1.46* 1.04 
Group 2: Situations of undue advantage, bribery and fraud             
    3. Acceptance of freely offered meals and small gifts while on duty 0.99  1.07 0.83  0.75 1.05  0.91 
    4. Speeding not reported in exchange for a bribe 0.71*  1.1 1.06  1.11 0.77  1.05 
    5. Officer taking money from a found wallet 0.63**  1.36 1.18  1.46* 0.74  2.12*** 
    6. Police officer stealing goods while investigating a burglary 1.42   1.14 1   1.22 1.07   1.58* 
Group 3: Refusal to register complaints             
    7. Police officer refusing to register a complaint by a former arrestee 1.07 0.87 1.29 0.92 0.9 1.22 0.99 1.3 1.36+ 
    8. Refusal to register complaint instead keeping victim in detention   0.9 1.18   0.75* 1.08   0.84 1.42+ 
Group 4: Reported severe crimes against individuals not followed up upon             
    9. Police officer refusing to register wife beating 1.42**  1.08 0.88  0.83 0.98  1.53* 
  10. Reported murder not being followed up   0.91 1.09   0.87 0.77   1.05 1.82** 
Group 5: Undue force used by the police             
  11. Foot patrol torturing a thief 1.03 1.18 0.86 1.57** 0.79 0.96 0.50*** 0.76 1.2 
  12. Brutal strike down of a demonstration     1.04     1.32     1.33 
Simple average of odds ratios in the column 1.01 0.92 1.11 1.02 0.88 1.05 0.97 1.08 1.43 
Note: Covariates include age, marital status, level of education, household size and district dummies. Sample size is 598. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. *,**, 
and *** denote statistical significance associated with the odds ratios at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. + denotes significance at the 20% level. In case 8 we compare 




The survey experiment made use of four “gendered” versions of below cases. The four 
questionnaires as administered are attached to this article. 
 
The 12 cases 
Group 1: Code of conduct among the police officers 
Case 1: A police officer, who happens to be a very good auto mechanic, is scheduled to work 
during coming holidays. The supervisor Catherine offers to give him these days off, if he agrees 
to repair her personal car. Evaluate the supervisor’s behavior. 
 
Case 2: At 2:00 a.m., a police officer, who is on duty, is driving his patrol car on a deserted 
road. He sees a vehicle that has been driven off the road and is stuck in a ditch. He approaches 
the vehicle and observes that the driver is not hurt but is obviously drunk. He also finds that 
the driver is a police officer. He transports the driver to her home. Evaluate the behavior of 
the police officer on duty. 
 
Group 2: Situations of undue advantage, bribery and fraud 
Case 3: A police officer routinely accepts free meals, cigarettes, and other items of small value 
from merchants on his duty. She does not solicit these gifts and is careful not to abuse the 
generosity of those who give gifts to her. 
 
Case 4: The police officer Godfrey stops a motorist for speeding. The officer agrees to accept 
a personal gift of half of the amount of the fine in exchange for not taking the offending motorist 
to court to answer to charges for the traffic offence. 
 
Case 5: A police officer finds a wallet in a parking lot. It contains an amount of money 
equivalent to a full day’s pay for that officer. She reports the wallet as lost property but keeps 
the money for herself. 
 
Case 6: The police officer Glory discovers a burglary of a general merchandise shop. The 
display cases are smashed, and it is obvious that many items have been taken. While searching 
the shop, she takes 10 jerricans of cooking oil and 1 sack of posho of 100 kilograms worth 





Group 3: Refusal to register complaints 
Case 7: A formerly arrested man comes to the police station and wants to fill in a complaint 
form. He claims that he was not treated properly during his arrest. The police officer Sarah 
who is in charge laughs at him and sends him away. 
 
Case 8: Samwel goes to a police station to register a complaint over one of their officers who 
had beaten and tortured him. At the station he finds a friend of the officer who tortured him. 
The friend refuses to register his complaint and instead decides to detain him for a weak over 
giving false information to the police. Evaluate the behavior of the friend. 
 
 
Group 4: Reported severe crimes against individuals not followed up upon 
Case 9: Mary goes to the police station to report a case where her husband has been beating 
her for the last one year. She lost one of her teeth and has a damaged eye due to the beating. 
The police officer on duty thinks this is a mere family dispute and not a crime for the police to 
handle. He refuses to register the case. 
 
Case 10: A police officer on duty receives a woman who wants to register a case of murder of 
her child by a neighbor. The officer registers the case and promises to follow up and arrest the 
suspect in a few hours’ time. Two days down the road, the suspect has not been arrested and 
was sending messages threatening to harm the complainant. The woman went back to the same 
police station to report the scenario and the suspect was arrested and detained at the police 
station. However, the suspect was released immediately on account that there was not enough 
evidence to convict him. Evaluate the behavior of the police officer who first received the 
woman. 
 
Group 5: Undue force used by the police 
Case 11: Two police officers on foot patrol surprise a man who is attempting to break into a 
shop. The man flees. They chase him for about ½ a kilometer before apprehending him by 
tackling him and wrestling him to the ground. After he is under control, both officers punch 
him a couple of times in the stomach and step on his back several times as punishment for 




Case 12: A subdistrict has a challenge of water shortage for a period of four months. The area 
leader together with residents decide to petition national water for the poor services and failure 
to deliver. However, the situation continues for two more months. The area leader and the 
residents opt to stage a peaceful demonstration as a way of showing their dissatisfaction. No 
sooner had the demonstration started than the District Police Commander deployed a team of 
officers with teargas and firing of live ammunitions killing 20 of the demonstrators including 
the area leader. Evaluate the District Police Commander’s behavior. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
